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less concentrated market.
 
Keywords: Defence industry; liberalization; EU; export; innovation; agent-based simulation model
JEL codes:  C6; F1; F5; L1; M2; O3
Martin Blom*, Fulvio Castellacci* and JArne Fevolden †
 
*Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), E-mail:  fc@nupi.no
† NIFU, Oslo, Norway E-mail: Arne.Fevolden@nifu.no
This draft: 20 December, 2011
Defence Firms Facing Liberalization
Innovation and Export in an Agent-based 
Model of the Defence Industry 

1. Introduction 
In the period from the end of the Cold War to the end of 1990s, sever-
al European countries have experienced a substantial decrease in their 
military budget and a significant loss of market shares vis-à-vis other 
international competitors. Defence firms and national authorities have 
reacted to these challenges by undertaking a process of restructuring 
and consolidation aimed at obtaining cost reductions through e.g. in-
ter-firm collaborations, mergers and acquisitions. This process is cur-
rently coupled with the recent attempt of EU public authorities to in-
troduce a greater degree of market liberalization in the future in order 
to avoid duplications and achieve stronger efficiency and international 
competitiveness in this market (Guay and Callum, 2002). 
 
A recent EU Directive (The European Union’s Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC) intends to provide a new frame-
work for policy interventions in the European defence market by lim-
iting the extent of national protection, extending cooperation and 
cross-border trade within the EU and eventually introducing a higher 
degree of market liberalization (Edwards, 2011). This EU Directive 
will be implemented by national Member States starting in early 2012, 
although it will probably face resistance and take some time until it 
will lead to a more open and more competitive EU defence market.  
 
The future scenario of openness and liberalization does certainly rep-
resent an important change for firms in the European defence industry. 
How will defence companies respond to these new challenges and op-
portunities – will they be able to adjust their innovation and business 
strategies in order to be more competitive in international markets? 
And how will the impacts of market liberalization differ between large 
and smaller European countries? 
 
Our investigation of these questions is rooted in the recent literature 
on firm heterogeneity and international trade, which has rapidly be-
come the new paradigm in the international economics literature. This 
framework highlights the importance of firm-specific capabilities (e.g. 
productivity, innovative ability) to explain why, within each industry, 
some enterprises are able to export whereas others are not (Melitz, 
2003; Helpman et alia, 2004).1 Companies respond differently to the 
process of market liberalization, and firm heterogeneity has therefore 
rapidly become the key pillar of these new theoretical structures. 
                                                 
1  A survey of this new strand of models is presented by Castellacci (2011). 
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While broadly in line with this new strand of international economics 
literature, we make use of a different modeling approach to study the 
effects of market liberalization on the international activities of firms 
in the defence industry. Agent-based models and simulations (ABMS) 
provide a framework to analyze a set of heterogenous agents and the 
interactions among them (North and Macal, 2007; Macal and North, 
2010). This modeling approach is well suited to investigate heteroge-
neity and complexity as key features of physical, biological and social 
systems. Among several other fields, this theoretical framework has 
recently found an increasing number of applications within economics 
and business research, e.g. in the fields of computational and evolu-
tionary economics (Tesfatsion, 2002; Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004; 
Dosi et alia, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, however, the 
ABMS approach has not been used before to analyze the question of 
exporting firms’ reaction to market liberalization, and, more specifi-
cally, it has never been applied before within the context of the de-
fence industry. 
 
A specific model of our interest is the so-called SKIN model (Simulat-
ing Knowledge Dynamics in Innovation Networks), introduced in a 
number of recent papers by Gilbert et alia (2007), Pyka et alia (2007) 
and Ahrweiller et alia (2011). This is an agent-based model that pro-
vides an accurate analysis of private firms’ interactions and 
knowledge dynamics in high-tech (or knowledge intensive) industries. 
Our theory is rooted in this recent model and extends it further by ap-
plying it to the study of the defence sector, and shifting the focus to 
the relationship between innovation and export dynamics within a 
context of increasing market liberalization. While the main structure 
of our model follows the main basic pillars of the SKIN approach, our 
framework departs from it in some important ways, given the peculi-
arities and idiosyncrasies that characterize the defence industry.  
 
In the ABMS model presented in this paper, heterogeneous agents 
(defence firms) in a given country compete in the market by produc-
ing new products. In any period t, the agents will sort in three distinct 
groups: (1) successful innovators that meet the requirement for receiv-
ing public R&D funding; (2) successful innovators that do not qualify 
for public support; (3) unsuccessful performers, which will try to ad-
just their performance by undertaking a new privately-funded R&D 
project or by imitating external knowledge and searching a coopera-
tion partner. 
 
The simulation analysis of this model points out that defence firms, 
when faced with a market liberalization scenario, will progressively 
become more efficient, less dependent on public procurement and in-
novation policy support, and more prone to knowledge sharing and 
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inter-firm collaborations. This firm-level dynamics will in the long-
run lead to an increase in the industry’s export propensity. Further, the 
effects of market liberalization will differ in large and smaller Europe-
an economies. Large countries are likely to experience greater overall 
benefits, e.g. in terms of reduced market and export concentration, but 
the impacts of market liberalization on their export propensity and in-
ternational performance will take a longer time to realize its full po-
tential.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 points out some key styl-
ized facts that the model seeks to reproduce; section 3 presents the 
model; section 4 defines the firm-level and industry-level variables 
used in the simulation analysis; section 5 presents the long-run proper-
ties and main outcomes of the model; section 6 discusses some alter-
native policy scenarios; and section 7 concludes by summarizing the 
key results and implications of the work.   
 
2. The defence industry: stylized facts 
The defence industry is in many respects a peculiar branch of the 
economy. In order to achieve a proper understanding of firms’ export 
activities in this sector, our model intends to resemble some of its key 
stylized facts and idiosyncrasies. 
 
Stylized fact 1: Firm heterogeneity: Defence firms are highly heter-
ogenous. They produce in a number of distinct market segments, rang-
ing from electronics to ICTs, engineering, chemicals and material sci-
ences, and are therefore characterized by a wide spectrum of technical 
competencies and product portfolios.2 In different market segments, 
large oligopolistic producers co-exist with smaller specialized suppli-
ers of defence material and equipment (Markovski et alia, 2010). 
 
Stylized fact 2: Stable and concentrated structure: The industry is 
typically characterized by a rather stable population of firms and little 
turbulence, and the entry and exit rates are much lower than in many 
other sectors. Most market segments are highly concentrated and 
characterized by an oligopolistic structure in which incumbents ex-
ploit their dominant position through high capital intensity and econ-
omies of scale and scope (Lichtenberg, 1995). The sector resembles 
closely the description of a Schumpeter Mark II type of innovation 
regime (Klepper, 1996; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
 
Stylized fact 3: High innovativeness: Technological innovation is as 
well-known a crucial ingredient in the production and commercializa-
tion of defence-related material. The industry is characterized by a 
very high share of enterprises with R&D activities (R&D propensity), 
and individual firms do on average spend a substantial amount of re-
sources to develop new products and processes (R&D intensity). The-
se technological activities are however characterized by a high degree 
of uncertainty and a long lag between the initial production of a new 
technology and its successful market commercialization (Lichtenberg, 
1995; Mowery, 2010). Further, a substantial share of firms’ R&D ac-
tivities is financed through public funding, due to their strategic im-
portance in terms of military capabilities and national security. Col-
laborations between private firms and public scientific organizations 
are frequent and important. In short, it is reasonable to characterize the 
defence industry as a science-based sector (Pavitt, 1984). 
                                                 
2  An accurate overview and classification of the different technological fields covered by 
firms in the defence industry is provided by the taxonomy developed by the European De-
fence Agency (EDA; see: http://www.eda.europa.eu).  
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Stylized fact 4: High export propensity: The industry has on aver-
age a high share of firms that sell their products abroad (export pro-
pensity). Differently from the very skewed size distribution that char-
acterizes most manufacturing industries, where only a few large enter-
prises within each sector are able to export (Melitz, 2003), in the de-
fence market it is often both large enterprises and smaller specialized 
suppliers that seek to compete in international markets through export 
activities (Castellacci and Fevolden, 2011). Their export success is not 
so much based on the price they set and the related terms of trade, but 
rather on the quality of the products and their degree of technological 
sophistication. In fact, the demand for defence equipment typically 
sets strong requirements in terms of the precision and reliability of the 
exported products. Accordingly, cooperation agreements and interac-
tions between user and producers are extensive (Malerba and Mon-
tobbio, 2003). 
 
Stylized fact 5: Active public involvement: The defence industry 
plays a strategic role in terms of national military and security objec-
tives, and it is for this reason heavily regulated and subject to an ex-
tensive and active public involvement. Public procurement, in particu-
lar, represents a traditional policy instrument through which defence 
authorities purchase a wide range of products and equipment from 
domestic firms. Public demand does therefore represent a stable and 
secure source of income for defence firms in a given country. Interna-
tional trade has also traditionally been actively regulated through so-
called offset, counter-trade agreements and national favoritism (dis-
crimination) such as the “buy-American act”, which impose re-
strictions to the amount and source of import and export activities 
(Markovski et alia, 2010). 
 
Stylized fact 6: Towards increasing liberalization: From the end of 
the Cold War to the end of 1990s, many European countries experi-
enced a substantial decrease in military budget and lost market shares 
vis-à-vis other international competitors. European defence firms and 
national authorities have reacted to this by undertaking a process of 
restructuring and consolidation aimed at obtaining cost reductions 
through e.g. greater cooperation, mergers and acquisitions. Further, 
EU public authorities are currently trying to introduce a greater degree 
of market liberalization in the future in order to avoid duplications and 
achieve stronger efficiency and international competitiveness in this 
market. The new EU Directive (2009/81/EC) mentioned above takes 
an explicit step in this direction (Guay and Callum, 2002; Edwards, 
2011). Increased liberalization represents an important new scenario 
that European defence companies will soon be faced with. 
 
3. The model 
Agent-based models and simulations (ABMS) provide a framework to 
analyze a set of heterogenous agents and the interactions among them 
(North and Macal, 2007; Macal and North, 2010). This modeling ap-
proach is well suited to investigate heterogeneity and complexity as 
key features of physical, biological and social systems. Among several 
other fields, this theoretical framework has recently found an increas-
ing number of applications within economics and business research, 
e.g. in the fields of computational and evolutionary economics 
(Tesfatsion, 2002; Frenken and Nuvolari, 2004; Frenken, 2006; Dosi 
et alia, 2010). 
 
A specific model of our interest is the so-called SKIN model (Simulat-
ing Knowledge Dynamics in Innovation Networks), introduced in a 
number of recent papers by Gilbert et alia (2007), Pyka et alia (2007) 
and Ahrweiller et alia (2011).3 This is an agent-based model that pro-
vides an accurate analysis of private firms’ interactions and 
knowledge dynamics in high-tech (or knowledge intensive) industries.  
Our paper is rooted in this recent model and extends it further by ap-
plying it to the study of the defence sector. While the main description 
of the model follows the main basic pillars of the SKIN approach, our 
model departs from it in some important ways, in the attempt to re-
produce the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies that characterize the de-
fence industry described in the previous section. Figure 1 presents a 
diagram describing the behavior of agents (private firms) and their 
market interactions within any given period t. 
 
 
                                                 
3  An extensive presentation of this approach along with a complete list of project activities 
and publications is available on the SKIN model’s website: 
http://cress.soc.surrey.ac.uk/skin/home. 
 
Figure 1. Model flowchart 
 
 
3.1 Agents 
Defence firms (business companies producing defence material, 
equipment and products) are the micro agents in the model. In line 
with our stylized fact 1 (firm heterogeneity), agents differ from each 
other in two main respects. First, they have different initial endow-
ments of financial capital, which they use both for their productive 
and innovative activities. Large firms co-exist with SMEs in the de-
fence market. Secondly, they differ in terms of their knowledge base, 
i.e. the pool of scientific and technological competencies and skills 
that the company employs in its innovative activities.4 The model rep-
resents the firm’s knowledge base as a set of units of knowledge. Each 
unit is a vector composed of three elements (or triple):  
 
 The capability (C), which defines a domain or area within the de-
fence industry (e.g. weapon production). It is represented in the 
model as a randomly chosen integer between 1 and 1000. 
 The ability (A), defining a specific ability or skill that the firm 
possesses in this C domain (e.g aerodynamic design technologies 
for platforms and weapons). It is a randomly chosen integer be-
tween 1 and 10. 
 The expertise (E), which indicates the level of expertise that the 
firm has in using the ability A. This is also represented as a ran-
domly chosen number between 1 (lowest) and 10 (highest). 
 
Defence firms compete in a highly innovative and technologically so-
phisticated environment (stylized fact 3). Our model assumes that all 
firms in the market actively use their knowledge base in the attempt to 
create new products and processes. Innovative activities are represent-
ed in the SKIN model in such a way that, at any period t, each compa-
ny formulates an innovation hypothesis, i.e. an idea or a plan for de-
veloping a new product or process. The model represents this innova-
tion hypothesis (IH) as a subset of the firm’s knowledge base, i.e. the 
enterprise focuses on a specific subset of its technological competence 
(capabilities, abilities, expertise) that it finds particularly promising 
and worth developing further. The subset of expertises (Ei) used in the 
innovation hypothesis are assumed to increase by one unit in the peri-
od, whereas those that are not used decrease by one unit (learning by 
doing and forgetting mechanisms). 
3.2 Economic environment 
In any period t, each enterprise uses its innovation hypothesis to try to 
develop a new product. The outcomes of the innovative process are 
subject to a high degree of uncertainty and introduce an important sto-
                                                 
4  In the original version of the SKIN model, the knowledge base is labelled kene. 
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chastic element in the model. The new product is characterized as an 
index number that depends on the number of capabilities and abilities 
entailed in the innovation hypothesis according to the function: 
 
P = ( ∑ Ci ∙ Ai) mod N                                                                        (1) 
 
where N is the maximum number of different products. The product is 
therefore characterized by the breadth of the innovation hypothesis, 
i.e. the number of different capabilities and abilities that the firm mas-
ters and it is able to combine in the development of the new artifact.  
By contrast, the quality of the product depends on the depth of the in-
novation hypothesis, i.e. it is a function of the enterprise’s specific 
abilities and expertise. Specifically, product quality is defined as an 
index number obtained by multiplying the abilities and expertise lev-
els for each of the vectors composing the innovation hypothesis and 
then normalizing the result. In other words, the key characteristic and 
value added of a new product does not depend on how broad the 
firm’s technological competence is, but rather how deep and special-
ized the company is in a specific sub-set or market niche. As ex-
plained below, this trade-off between competence breadth versus 
depth is an important characteristic driving the model’s outcomes. 
 
In order to produce the new product, the firm searches for inputs (e.g. 
capital equipment) in the market. The type of input it needs depends 
on the characteristics of the product it wants to develop (P), and it 
eventually purchases the one with the lowest price and, ceteris pari-
bus, the highest quality. If the enterprise does not find any input in the 
market at a price it can afford, it will not enter the production process. 
Once the product is ready for market commercialization, the firm sets 
its price by applying a mark-up (profit margin) over the total costs. 
Depending on the market demand available for this product, an ad-
justment mechanism tends to increase (decrease) its price over time if 
the demand level is high (low). 
 
More specifically, the model assumes that demand patterns differ for 
different segments of the defence industry. On the one hand, interme-
diate products are sold to other firms within the defence sector and 
their price is subject to the adjustment mechanism noted above. On the 
other hand, new products that are destined to the end users are always 
absorbed by the market. This assumption is in line with the fact that, 
in the defence industry, public procurement assumes a pivotal role, i.e. 
defence authorities typically purchase a substantial amount of new (or 
existing) defence products and material from domestic firms in order 
to secure military capabilities and so achieve national defence strate-
gic objectives.  
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Given these market interactions and outcomes, at any period t the firm 
achieves a certain level of profit – which is largely dependent on the 
characteristics and quality of the new product it sells. We further as-
sume that if the enterprise’s profits are large enough to cover sunk ex-
port costs (i.e. above a given profit threshold), then the enterprise is 
able to start the commercialization of its product also to foreign mar-
kets. This is in line with the key idea of the recent literature on firm 
heterogeneity and international trade (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman et 
alia, 2004), according to which only the most successful and produc-
tive enterprises within each sector are able to pay sunk export costs 
and overcome trade barriers in international markets, whereas most 
other companies will only produce for the domestic market. 
3.3 Performance adjustment and feedback loops 
After having produced and commercialized its product, the firm looks 
at its current market performance (i.e. the profits it has realized at time 
t), and decides whether this is satisfactory or not, and how it can be 
improved in the future. The model’s parameter success threshold (de-
fined in further details in section 4) indicates the profit level that 
marks the distinction between successful versus unsuccessful perfor-
mance. This parameter is exogenously set at a given level for all firms 
in the market. For simplicity, we start by assuming that this success 
threshold corresponds to the mean profit level in the industry: enter-
prises whose profits are above (below) the industry-level mean will be 
satisfied (not satisfied) with their current performance.  
 
There are two ways in which an enterprise can improve its perfor-
mance over time. One can only be pursued by successful innovators, 
whereas the other is followed by unsuccessful performers.  
 
New publicly-funded R&D projects: If a firm is satisfied with the 
profits it has realized, it may decide to apply for public funding for 
improving its product further (publicly-funded incremental innova-
tion). Public defence authorities typically finance a substantial amount 
of domestic R&D activities through public procurement (stylized fact 
5: Active public involvement). We assume that this public funding is 
granted to the applicant according to two complementary criteria: (1) 
The quality of the firm’s product has to be above a given product 
quality threshold; (2) The firm’s technological and competence 
breadth (i.e. the number of capabilities C in its innovation hypothesis) 
has to be above a given competence breadth threshold. The intuition 
behind this public funding allocation mechanism is in line with the 
practice that public defence authorities typically follow. Put it simply, 
when policy-makers evaluate the possibility to finance a company to 
develop a new product, they look at both: (1) the quality of its current 
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product, which gives them an indication of the likelihood that the firm 
will be able to produce a successful incremental innovation of it in the 
future; and (2) the breadth of the firm’s expertise in several different 
areas, since large multi-product and multi-competence enterprises are 
those that have presumably received public funding already in the past 
and thus previously developed a reliable user-producer relationship 
with public authorities. All in all, the possibility for successful firms 
to apply for new publicly-funded R&D projects introduce a source of 
cumulative causation in the model, since in any period t there will be a 
limited number of successful companies that will be able to qualify for 
public R&D support, which is likely to lead to further incremental in-
novation and satisfactory profits for them in the future. 
 
New privately-funded R&D projects and cooperation: If a firm is 
not satisfied with the profits it has realized, it will try to improve its 
performance by starting to search in a new direction (Nelson and Win-
ter, 1982). An enterprise can apply two different search strategies to 
adjust its performance. (1) If its current product was sold in the market 
but the demand level was not sufficient to realize a satisfactory profit 
level, the company will undertake a new R&D project funded through 
its own internal resources (financial capital). The new R&D project 
will aim at improving one of the abilities (A) in its innovation hypoth-
esis – or, put it differently, to achieve a better specialization and tech-
nological sophistication in the technological space on which it is cur-
rently focusing (i.e. an increased technological depth, given its current 
breadth). (2) By contrast, if the firm’s current product did not meet 
any demand in the market (hence leading to negative profits), this 
gives a clear indication that the firm’s current innovation hypothesis is 
not well suited to the user requirements, and that it must be adjusted. 
The enterprise can do this by searching for an external partner for co-
operation. The firm will first search among its previous partners, then 
its suppliers and users, by looking at the capability sets they possess as 
indicated by their respective innovation hypotheses and market prod-
uct characteristics. When a firm finds a collaboration partner, it can 
add the partner’s innovation hypothesis triples to its own, thus achiev-
ing a broadening up of its capability set and knowledge base. Put it 
differently, cooperation enables the exchange of knowledge among 
different agents, and this is likely to improve the performance of these 
by augmenting their respective knowledge bases and technological 
competencies. All in all, the two strategies pursued by unsuccessful 
performers – privately-funded R&D and cooperation – introduce in 
the model a catch up mechanism, since firms lagging behind the tech-
nological frontier may improve their technological position and adjust 
their market performance by means of such R&D and imitation strate-
gies. 
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A summary and overview of the model (see figure 1) highlights the 
following two key features of this theoretical framework. First, in any 
period t, the agents will be sorted in three distinct groups: (1) success-
ful innovators that qualify for public funding (see figure 1, loop 1); (2) 
successful innovators that do not meet the criteria for public support 
(loop 2); (3) unsuccessful performers, which will either undertake a 
new privately-funded R&D project or imitate by searching a coopera-
tion partner (loop 3). Secondly, the overall dynamics of the model, as 
shown in the next section, depends on the combination of two differ-
ent mechanisms: (1) a cumulative causation mechanism according to 
which the best performers will tend to get public support and hence 
strengthen their market position even further in the future; (2) a catch 
up mechanism through which less successful companies will be able 
to adjust their performance and possibly achieve a leading market po-
sition in the future. Section 5 will analyze how these mechanisms 
shape the long-run properties of the model, and section 6 will then in-
vestigate how future policy changes towards liberalization (see styl-
ized fact 6) may shape export dynamics and market opportunities in 
the defence industry. 
4. Variables and indicators 
4.1 Key parameters: environmental and policy characteristics 
The following four parameters describe some key characteristics of 
the economic environment in which agents operate, which may be af-
fected by policy actions and strategies over time. They represent the 
main explanatory variables of interest in our simulation analysis. 
 
Cooperation propensity: This defines the extent to which agents are 
willing (and able) to cooperate with others in the same market, i.e. 
their collaboration propensity. This parameter ranges on a continuous 
scale from 0,50 (lowest cooperation propensity) to 0 (highest propen-
sity). 
 
Success threshold: This indicates the threshold above (below) which 
firms consider themselves satisfied (not satisfied) with their current 
market performance (e.g. corresponding to the mean profit level in the 
industry). The parameter is defined in the profit space ranging from 0 
to 12 000. This parameter is largely dependent on the extent and in-
tensity of market competition, i.e. the success threshold is higher 
(lower) in a more (less) open and competitive market, because agents 
must compete with a greater (smaller) number of competitors (includ-
ing foreign firms) in order to maintain their market position. In other 
words, in a more (less) open and competitive market companies tend 
to be more (less) demanding because they are aware they face a 
stronger (weaker) competition.  
 
Public funding requirement I: Product quality threshold: This is 
the first of the two criteria set by public authorities to grant public 
support to private defence firms. It ranges on a continuous scale de-
fined on the quality domain between 0 (loose quality requirement, 
easy to get public funding) to 10 (strict quality requirement, difficult 
to get public support). 
 
Public funding requirement II: Competence breadth threshold: 
This is the second requirement for qualifying for public support. The 
parameter ranges on a continuous scale defined on the innovation hy-
pothesis domain between 0 (narrow technological competence, easy to 
get public funding for most firms) to 10 (broad technological compe-
tence, difficult to get public support for many narrowly specialized 
companies). 
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4.2 Other model parameters  
These parameters do also represent environmental characteristics af-
fecting the industry dynamics. However, they may not be influenced 
by policy actions in the short-run. We will not report the results of the 
simulation analysis for these variables in order to save some space 
(these are available upon request). 
 
Number of firms: Total number of enterprises in the market. 
 
Number of products: Total number of products that are sold in the 
market. 
 
Share of large firms: Number of large enterprises as a percentage of 
the total number of firms in the market. 
 
Share of end products firms: Number of enterprises that produce 
final products as a percentage of the total number of firms in the in-
dustry. 
4.3 Key aggregate (industry-level) outcomes 
The following six variables are aggregate outcomes of the model, i.e. 
emergent properties that are observed at the industry-level as the result 
of micro-level behavior and agents’ interactions. They represent the 
key variables defining the performance of the defence industry, and 
thus the main factors we seek to explain in our simulation analysis.  
 
Export propensity (%): Number of exporters as a share of the total 
number of firms in the industry. This is the variable typically high-
lighted by recent models of firm heterogeneity and international trade 
(e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman et alia, 2004). As explained in the previ-
ous section, only firms that are above a given profitability level are 
assumed to be able to cover sunk export costs and export their prod-
ucts in foreign markets, whereas most other enterprises will continue 
to produce only for the domestic market. This is the main variable of 
interest in our simulation analysis, since it is typically used as an indi-
cator of the export performance of an industry for a given country. 
 
Mean product quality: It is the industry-level average of the index 
measuring each firm’s product quality. 
 
New privately-funded R&D projects (%): Number of companies 
that undertake new privately-funded R&D projects as a percentage of 
the total number of firms. 
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New publicly-funded R&D projects (%): Number of enterprises that 
qualify for publicly-funded R&D projects as a share of the total num-
ber of firms. 
 
Concentration index: We use the C5 concentration index, defined as 
the total financial capital owned by the five largest firms in the market 
as a share of the total financial capital in the defence industry. 
 
Export concentration ratio (%): We define this as the E5 export 
concentration index, i.e. the total value of export obtained by the five 
largest firms in the market as a percentage of the total value of export 
in the defence industry. 
 
5. The long-run properties of the 
model 
We have carried out the following set of simulation exercises in order 
to analyze the long-run properties of the model. We have focused on 
the six key aggregate (industry-level) outcome variables (listed in sec-
tion 4.3), and investigated how each of them is affected in the long-
run by variations in the set of the four explanatory variables (the key 
policy and environmental parameters listed in section 4.1). Specifical-
ly, for each explanatory variable, we have run a set of 200 simulations 
(each of which lasting for a 300-period time horizon5) where the vari-
able takes all possible values in its definition domain (from the mini-
mum to the maximum). In each simulation, we have recorded the val-
ue of the six (industry-level) outcome variables at the end of the simu-
lation run (t = 300), and then plotted on a two-dimensional graph the 
relationship between each explanatory variable and the resulting 
(long-run) value of each outcome variable. The results of this analysis 
are presented in figures 2 to 5. Each figure focuses on one explanatory 
factor and its relationships to the six aggregate outcome variables. 
These graphs point out the four main long-run properties of the model, 
which we briefly outline as follows. 
 
Result 1: A logistic relationship linking the cooperation propensity 
and the export propensity. 
 
The first panel of figure 2 shows this positive long-run relationship 
between the cooperation and the export propensity. The intuition be-
hind this result is that when the cooperation propensity is very low, its 
effects on firms’ export activities are on average limited. Among the 
firms that register an unsatisfactory market performance, only a small 
share of them are able to find an external partner for cooperation, so 
the overall extent of imitation and intra-industry knowledge spillovers 
is limited, and it does not affect substantially the export propensity of 
the industry. By contrast, above a certain threshold of the cooperation 
propensity parameter (< 0,30), unsuccessful firms are much better at 
exploiting external knowledge opportunities, and, thanks to the related 
spillovers effects, they may be able to catch up with the technological 
frontier in the industry and even export their products abroad. Put it 
differently, referring to the model flow chart previously presented in 
figure 1 (section 2), when the cooperation propensity increases over a 
                                                 
5  We have decided to stop our simulation run at period 300 because the model dynamics 
gets remarkably stable from that period onwards.  
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certain threshold, a good number of unsuccessful firms (loop 3) are 
able to escape their “poverty trap” and enter one of the more virtuous 
circles (loops 1 and 2) that may lead them to export activities. 
 
This model dynamics is mirrored and further explained by the other 
panels of figure 2. An increase in the cooperation propensity parame-
ter also leads to an increase of the industry’s product quality (as a re-
sult of this catch up dynamics), a smaller share of new privately-
funded R&D projects and a larger share of publicly-funded R&D ac-
tivities (since more firms are satisfied with their performance, and on 
average better at meeting the requirements for receiving public inno-
vation support). Further, the last two panels of figure 2 show a de-
crease in the C5 industry concentration index (more firms catch up 
with the technological frontier and the market becomes less concen-
trated) and also a decrease in the E5 export concentration ratio (SMEs 
increase their export shares vis-à-vis large oligopolistic exporters, 
which worsen their international performance). 
 
This first result has an important policy interpretation and relevance. 
When a higher degree of liberalization will be introduced in the Euro-
pean defence market in the future – i.e. with the implementation of the 
new EU Directive by national Member States – each national market 
will be characterized by a higher cooperation propensity, as defence 
firms will progressively become more aware of the external sources of 
technological opportunities available in an enlarged and more inte-
grated economic environment and thus more prone to collaboration 
agreements and knowledge sharing. Therefore, this first result may be 
seen as an indication of how the export propensity in each national 
market will react in the long-run to this policy change and the shift 
towards liberalization. 
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Figure 2: Effects of an increase in the cooperation propensity (X-
axis) on the six industry-level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Result 2:  An inverse U-shaped relationship between the success 
threshold and the export propensity. 
 
Figure 3 (first panel) illustrates this second result. When the success 
threshold is low, firms are on average satisfied with their market per-
formance. To illustrate, if the industry is characterized by very low 
openness and competition intensity, domestic enterprises are arguably 
not too concerned about the threat of international competition, and 
are therefore likely to continue their business-as-usual activities with-
out feeling too much pressure to become more productive or explore 
different technological trajectories. Under these conditions, the mean 
product quality in the industry is relatively low, and the firms are not 
under pressure to increase their product quality by means of coopera-
tion and new privately-funded R&D projects (firms in loop 3) or pub-
licly-funded projects (firms in loops 1 and 2). The export propensity in 
the industry is therefore low: the enterprises are relatively satisfied 
with their domestic position and performance, and do not have the 
ambition and capability to sell their products abroad. 
 
However, as the market becomes more open and competitive, the suc-
cess threshold increases and these outcome variables tend to respond 
positively: firms increase their private R&D efforts (loop 3), their 
product quality and their ability to attract public funding (loops 1 and 
2). As a result, a larger number of firms will be able to achieve high 
profitability and export their products in international markets. 
 
Nevertheless, this type of dynamics will not continue indefinitely. Af-
ter a certain limit (> 9000), the success threshold and market competi-
tion intensity will be so high that the enterprises will not be able to 
improve their performance any further. This happens when the entry 
of foreign productive firms into the domestic market makes it too hard 
for domestic enterprises to continue to produce. After this point, fur-
ther increases in the success threshold (market competition) will there-
fore result in a stagnant product quality dynamics and a decrease in 
the industry’s export propensity. Similarly to the previous, this second 
result does also have a direct policy interpretation, since the progres-
sive increase of our success threshold parameter simulates the possible 
effects of the introduction of a higher degree of market liberalization 
and competition in the future enlarged EU defence market. 
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Figure 3: Effects of an increase in the success threshold (X-axis) 
on the six industry-level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Result 3: A logistic relationship linking the product quality threshold 
(public funding requirement I) and the export propensity. 
 
Figure 4 reports this emergent property of the model. Although the 
shape of the logistic pattern identified by result 3 is analogous to the 
one pointed out for result 1, the underlying mechanism is different, 
since it focuses on the dynamics of public support rather than the ef-
fects of knowledge spillovers. Put it simply, when public defence au-
thorities set a low quality threshold that firms have to satisfy in order 
to receive public R&D funding, this makes it easy for many defence 
companies to apply and get this type of policy support. This has two 
effects. The direct effect is of course that there is a large share of firms 
in the industry that are able to undertake new publicly-funded R&D 
projects (including both successful and less successful companies). 
The indirect effect, though, is that in such a generous and protected 
environment, less successful firms will not actively seek to increase 
their performance through product quality improvements, since public 
funding easily provides them with a mean to achieve their desired 
profit target. In this environment, the industry will tend to be more 
concentrated – successful firms outperform less successful enterprises 
– and the overall export propensity is on average low. 
 
However, if public authorities become more restrictive and set a high-
er quality threshold for allocating R&D funding, the indirect effect 
will progressively become stronger and counterbalance the direct ef-
fect. That is to say, even if a lower share of firms will be able to meet 
the requirements for attracting public funding, a greater number of 
firms will increasingly feel under pressure to adjust their performance 
through product quality improvements rather than public procurement, 
and for this reason the industry will progressively become less con-
centrated and more export-oriented. Here again, the policy interpreta-
tion of this result is clear: when the new EU Directive will gradually 
limit the extent of national protection and make domestic public pro-
curement tenders more open to international competition, domestic 
firms will face the threat of foreign competition and will therefore 
have to invest more actively in technology and quality upgrades in 
order to maintain their competitive position. 
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Figure 4: Effects of an increase in the product quality threshold 
(public funding requirement I, X-axis) on the six industry-level 
outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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Result 4: A flat linear relationship (weak correlation) between the 
competence breadth threshold (public funding requirement II) and the 
export propensity. 
 
The first panel of figure 5 shows this pattern. An increase in the com-
petence breadth threshold, the second of the two criteria used by pub-
lic authorities to allocate R&D grants, does not lead to any visible in-
crease in the export propensity of the industry in the long-run. The 
reason for this is that in our model export activities and profits are 
mainly dependent on the quality of the product sold by the firm (tech-
nological depth) rather than the number of different capabilities mas-
tered by the enterprise and used for the production of the new variety 
(technological or competence breadth). This implies that, when policy 
makers decide to make this second criterion more restrictive, they will 
start to allocate R&D funds mainly to large multi-product and multi-
competence enterprises, which already have a dominant position in the 
market. By contrast, it will become increasingly difficult for SMEs, 
specialized in more narrow industry segments and market niches, to 
meet this public funding requirement. The overall effect is that, differ-
ently from what pointed out for result 3, there will not be any indirect 
effect counter-balancing the reduced number of publicly-funded R&D 
projects, i.e. defence firms will not start to invest more actively to up-
grade their product quality, so that the industry’s mean quality and 
export propensity will on average not increase. This is explained by 
the fact that public authorities, by emphasizing competence breadth as 
the key criterion to apply for public R&D funding, do not give a clear 
and explicit signal to firms that they should actively improve their 
product quality, i.e. the funding allocation mechanism (competence 
breadth) is not in line with the key market requirement for achieving 
an internationally competitive position (technological depth).  
 
For this fourth result too, the policy interpretation and implication is 
quite explicit. Undertaking a process of reform towards market liberal-
ization, national defence authorities will progressively have to make 
the criteria to allocate public R&D support more restrictive and de-
manding, since foreign firms will also be gradually invited to partici-
pate in public procurement tenders (as the new EU Directive indi-
cates). If policy-makers will decide to increase public allocations 
mainly for large multi-product and multi-competence enterprises, this 
will tend to make these oligopolistic producers stronger and more 
competitive but will not lead to any increase in the number of export-
ing firms in the industry (result 4). By contrast, if the authorities de-
cide to emphasize the first allocation criterion (product quality), this 
will have a visible effect and act to increase the industry’s mean quali-
ty and export propensity (result 3). 
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Figure 5: Effects of an increase in the competence breadth thresh-
old (public funding requirement II, X-axis) on the six industry-
level outcome variables (Y-axis). 
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6. Simulation of different policy  
scenarios for EU countries 
This section makes use of these four long-run properties of the model 
to analyze and compare six different policy scenarios. The exercise is 
intended to compare the current situation – in which the European de-
fence industry is characterized by a high level of national protection 
and a low degree of market liberalization – with five possible future 
scenarios, which will be realized when public defence authorities in 
European countries will start to implement the new EU Directive and 
thus introduce a stronger degree of openness and liberalization in this 
market. 
 
The current scenario is obtained by calibrating the model in order to 
fit the dynamics of an industry with an export propensity between 35 
and 40%, which corresponds on average to the real percentage of ex-
porting firms in national defence markets in Europe. Specifically, we 
present two versions of our calibration exercise, one for a small coun-
try (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Norway) and the other for a large 
economy (e.g. France, Germany, UK). The small country version has 
150 defence enterprises, 60 products and an average export intensity 
of 50% (i.e. we reasonably assume that in a small domestic market 
exporting firms do on average sell a substantial share of their defence 
products abroad). The large country version has instead 500 enterpris-
es, 400 products and a 10% mean export intensity (i.e. if the domestic 
market is large, exporting firms sell on average a greater share of their 
products at home and a smaller share abroad). 
 
The specific values that we have used to calibrate these three parame-
ters (number of firms, number of products and export intensity) are 
purely indicative and do not correspond to real data for the defence 
industry in European countries (which are not available). The idea is 
to set up a stylized and simple comparison between a large and a small 
national defence market, and see whether and the extent to which the-
se country-specific differences affect the outcomes of the model. It is 
important to notice, however, that the results described below do not 
depend on the specific parameter setting that we have used to calibrate 
the large- and small-country cases, but are general and hold also for 
different configurations of the parameters set that we have experi-
mented with. 
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After setting up the current scenario, we have then constructed five 
future scenarios that represent different possible trajectories that the 
industry may follow in the future as a result of different policy strate-
gies in terms of the implementation of the new EU Directive. These 
five scenarios differ in terms of how rapidly and actively defence au-
thorities of national Member States will decide to implement the new 
Directive and introduce market liberalization, i.e. the typology goes 
from a softer and more gradual implementation towards a more rapid 
and radical market reform. 
 
(1) Higher success threshold scenario: This represents a situation in 
which national policy-makers of, say, country X do not introduce any 
significant and active reform towards liberalization. However, the in-
creased openness of other EU countries’ defence sectors naturally in-
duces a stronger degree of competition in country X’s domestic mar-
ket. Faced with the challenge posed by the entry of other European 
firms into the domestic market, country X’s enterprises will react by 
adjusting their success threshold upward. 
 
(2) Higher cooperation scenario: If national defence authorities intro-
duce measures aimed at promoting inter-firm collaborations (within 
and across countries), defence firms will tend to increase their cooper-
ation propensity and, hence, their ability to exploit knowledge spillo-
vers effects. 
 
(3) Higher product quality threshold scenario: Policy-makers may 
also decide to change public procurement mechanisms and modify the 
criteria they use to allocate public R&D funds to defence companies. 
This may be a natural consequence of the fact that foreign EU enter-
prises will be allowed to participate in national public procurement 
tenders, thus making these much more competitive and demanding for 
domestic firms. In particular, if national authorities decide to empha-
size the first allocation criterion, they will increase the product quality 
threshold that firms have to satisfy in order to qualify for public sup-
port.  
 
(4) Increased competence breadth threshold scenario: By contrast, if 
they decide to focus on the second allocation criterion, they will in-
crease the competence breadth threshold, and hence start to allocate 
more funds to large multi-product and multi-competence firms and 
fewer resources to smaller specialized suppliers. 
 
(5) Market liberalization scenario: Finally, if all the policy strategies 
indicated by the previous four scenarios are combined and implement-
ed together, we obtain a full market liberalization scenario. This may 
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be thought of as the most rapid and most radical way of introducing 
market liberalization in the defence industry. 
 
Figure 6 reports the results of the policy simulation analysis. Each 
panel of the figure focuses on one of the six industry-level outcome 
variables, for the small- and large-country versions of the model re-
spectively. In each graph, we report the time path of a given variable 
for the six different scenarios outlined above and for a 150-run peri-
od.6  
 
The first panel of figure 6 focuses on the dynamics of export propensi-
ty in the defence industry. The current scenario shows the basic work-
ing of the model. Over time, firms tend to learn and improve their 
technological performance by means of learning by doing, coopera-
tion and R&D activities, so that the number of exporters in the indus-
try does gradually increase as time goes by. Correspondingly, the oth-
er graphs indicate that in this basic scenario the mean product quality 
in the industry will increase over time, the number of firms receiving 
public funding will increase, and the concentration level will therefore 
decrease. However, a comparison between the current scenario and 
the other five shows that the former is the one characterized by the 
worst performance in the long-run (i.e. lowest product quality and ex-
port propensity at t = 150). Specifically, we observe the following five 
patterns.  
 
(1) In the higher success threshold scenario, companies are on aver-
age more responsive to market opportunities and more actively invest-
ing in product quality and technology upgrading vis-à-vis what they 
tend to do in the current scenario (for the reasons explained in result 2, 
see section 5). This second scenario is therefore characterized by a 
more rapid increase of export propensity over time, which eventually 
stabilizes at a value around 40%. This is also the scenario where firms 
undertake the greatest number of new privately-funded R&D projects 
in order to adjust and improve their technological performance. A 
comparison of the small- and large-country versions of the model in-
dicates that the main difference is in terms of the two concentration 
indexes (see last two panels of figure 6). The decrease in the C5 and 
E5 concentration indexes over time is much stronger in a large coun-
try than in a small economy. 
 
(2) The higher cooperation scenario is the one where defence firms, 
due to their higher collaboration propensity, exploit more actively the 
opportunities provided by external learning and knowledge spillovers 
                                                 
6  We have repeated each exercise for a total of 20 replications in order to make sure that 
our results are robust to the presence of stochastic shocks related to R&D activities and 
outcomes. Each point reported in the various graphs in panel 6 is the average of these 
Monte Carlo replications. 
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effects (see result 1). This explains why this scenario outperforms the 
current one leading to a much higher export propensity (around 50%). 
Due to the strength of this imitation-based catch up mechanism, a sub-
stantially number of firms are able to attract public funding for carry-
ing out R&D activities. Many of these SMEs and catching up enter-
prises are also able to start to export their products abroad, so that the 
E5 export concentration ratio decreases significantly over time (for the 
large country the decrease is visibly more pronounced than for the 
small-country). 
 
(3) The higher product quality threshold scenario also leads to a high-
er export propensity in the long-run (between 40 and 45%) and a low-
er market and export concentration. Differently from the previous, 
though, in this policy scenario enterprises are able to strengthen their 
market position over time despite the fact that public funding opportu-
nities decrease (result 3). The increase in the export propensity and the 
decrease in the market and export concentration are stronger in the 
large- than the small-country version of the model. The reason is that 
the competition and selection mechanisms triggered by product quali-
ty enhancing investments are magnified and arguably have stronger 
effects in a large market than in a small economy. 
 
(4) The increased competence breadth threshold scenario does not 
lead to any substantial change as compared to the current scenario. 
This is because, as pointed out by result 4 (section 5), this second pub-
lic funds allocation mechanism (technological breadth) is not aligned 
with the crucial market requirement for competing in international 
markets (technological depth). Hence, this will end up by strengthen-
ing the leading position of large oligopolistic producers but will not 
increase export opportunities for most other SMEs in the market. In 
this scenario, no main difference emerges between the large- and 
small-country simulations. 
 
(5) Finally, the market liberalization scenario clearly outperforms all 
other policy strategies considered in figure 6, since this is obtained by 
combining together all four previous scenarios, representing the pos-
sibility that national defence authorities will opt for a rapid and radical 
reform of the defence market towards openness and full liberalization. 
This would lead, according to this model, to a substantial increase in 
the number of exporting firms and a more competitive and less con-
centrated market in the long-run. It is also interesting to note that the 
effects of full market liberalization on export propensity are more rap-
id in the small-country version of the model, whereas in the large-
economy version the market liberalization scenario takes a substantial-
ly longer time (between 50 and 100 runs) before overtaking the others. 
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We conclude our simulation analysis by presenting the results of one 
final exercise that is useful to summarize and highlight one key fact 
outlined by this model. Table 1 presents the results of four panel data 
regressions that point out the statistical relationship between firms’ 
performance (profits and export participation), on the one hand, and 
technological breadth and depth, on the other. The regressions are run 
on the set of simulated data produced by two of our model’s scenarios: 
the current one and the market liberalization scenario. These are firm-
level panel dataset (150 firms for a 200-period time span) obtained 
from our small-country model calibration. We make use of panel fixed 
effects estimators to analyze this reduced-form relationship that char-
acterizes agents’ behavior in our model.  
 
The results, as shown in table 1, are in line with the main intuition al-
ready discussed along the paper. In both scenarios, firms’ performance 
is positively and significantly related to their product quality, and neg-
atively linked to the length of their innovation hypothesis. In other 
words, the model points out the existence of a trade-off between tech-
nological breadth and depth: it is the latter factor that makes firms in-
ternationally competitive in a given industry segment or market niche. 
If policy makers aim at increasing the export propensity of the indus-
try, it is product quality, and not firm size or competence breadth, the 
key firm-level factor they should target and try to foster. 
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Figure 6: Simulating six different policy scenarios 
 
Time path of export propensity (%) 
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Time path of product quality 
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Time path of new privately-funded R&D projects (%) 
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Time path of new publicly-funded R&D projects (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48  Martin Blom, Fulvio Castellacci and Arne Fevolden 
Time path of the concentration index (C5) 
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Time path of the export concentration ratio E5 (%) 
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Table 1: Regression results: firms’ profits and export activities as 
a function of their product quality (technological depth) and inno-
vation hypothesis length (competence breadth) – Panel fixed effects 
estimations (FE) on the simulated firm-level dataset 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Scenario 
 
Current 
 
Market  
liberalization 
 
Current 
 
Market  
liberalization 
 
Estimation method 
 
Linear FE 
 
 
Linear FE 
 
 
Probit FE 
 
 
Probit FE 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
Profits 
 
 
Profits 
 
 
Export dummy 
 
 
Export dummy 
 
 
Product quality 
(technological depth) 
 
3484.86 
(21.32)*** 
 
2820.03 
(38.5)*** 
 
0.9452 
(20.41)*** 
 
0.8780 
(53.50)*** 
 
IH length  
(technological breadth) 
 
-1960.12 
(-20.19)*** 
 
-905.45 
(-20.84)*** 
 
-0.1382 
(-6.60)*** 
 
-0.0346 
(-4.67)*** 
 
Year 
 
 
10.95 
(7.88)*** 
 
 
-4.46 
(-2.60)*** 
 
 
0.0055 
(16.11)*** 
 
 
0.0023 
(7.74)*** 
 
 
Observations 
 
 
30150 
 
 
30150 
 
 
26130 
 
 
29547 
 
 
The regressions include a constant. Significance levels: ***: 1%.
7. Conclusions 
The paper has presented an agent-based simulation model of the de-
fence industry. The model is set up in such a way that it resembles 
some of the key stylized facts and idiosyncrasies of the defence sector, 
and studies how this may react when a higher degree of openness and 
liberalization will be introduced in this market. In particular, the exer-
cise is valuable and timely in a European context, given that the new 
EU Directive (2009/81/EC) has recently introduced a new policy 
framework that will gradually lead to a progressive liberalization of 
the defence market. It is therefore important to investigate how micro-
level agents (defence firms) in each domestic market will respond to 
these new challenges and opportunities. The results of the simulation 
analysis of this model highlight four main results and implications. 
 
First, as the EU defence sector will gradually become more open and 
integrated, firms in each national market will start to adjust their own 
performance criteria and expectations upward, i.e. their success 
threshold will increase as the industry becomes more open and com-
petitive. This external environmental pressure will induce firms to in-
vest more actively in technology and product quality upgrading, thus 
increasing the overall industry performance and export propensity in 
the long-run. This is likely to happen, according to our model, even in 
the absence of explicit actions of national policy-makers intended to 
introduce reforms towards market liberalization in their respective 
country. 
 
Secondly, if national defence authorities will instead decide to under-
take a more active strategy, e.g. by introducing schemes intended to 
foster inter-firm collaborations (within and across countries), this will 
substantially improve the performance of the industry. Defence enter-
prises will become more prone and better able to exploit the opportu-
nities provided by external learning and knowledge spillovers, and this 
will eventually lead to a higher product quality and export propensity 
in the industry. 
 
Thirdly, national policy-makers may also contemplate the possibility 
to change public procurement rules and revise some of the criteria 
they use to allocate R&D support to private firms. The new EU Di-
rective does in fact intend to introduce a higher degree of openness in 
public procurement tenders, by allowing other foreign (EU) firms to 
participate in the public procurement tenders announced by a given 
national Member State. If national policy makers will allow for this, 
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they will inevitably have to revise their public funding allocation crite-
ria making them more restrictive. They may do that in two different 
ways. They may either increase the product quality threshold that the 
applicant firms have to satisfy (which depends on the degree of spe-
cialization or depth that the firm has in a specific industry segment), 
or increase the minimum competence breadth that the applicant must 
have (which is directly related to the firm’s size). Our model shows 
that emphasizing the first criterion will lead to a substantial improve-
ment in the industry’s performance in the long-run, whereas the se-
cond will not. The reason for this is that the first criterion provides 
defence firms with a clear signal that product quality is the key factor 
to compete in international markets (more firms will then become ex-
porters), while the second tends to concentrate public R&D funding 
opportunities in the hands of a limited number of large oligopolistic 
enterprises. In this way, these dominant enterprises will arguably 
strengthen their international position, but the total number of export-
ing firms in the industry (export propensity) will stay the same. 
 
Finally, our simulation results indicate that the effects of market liber-
alization in this sector will differ in large and smaller European econ-
omies. On the one hand, large countries are likely to experience great-
er overall benefits in terms of reduced market and export concentra-
tion, due to the fact that the catching up, competition and selection 
dynamics of the model are magnified in the presence of a larger and 
more populated market. On the other hand, however, the positive ef-
fects of market liberalization unfold more rapidly in a small economy 
and more slowly in a larger country. The policy implication of this 
fourth result, in our view, is that large European countries should take 
the lead in the implementation of the new EU Directive and pursue a 
more active and more rapid process of market liberalization than small 
European countries. 
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